The Failure of Felix Frankfurter by Urofsky, Melvin I.
University of Richmond Law Review
Volume 26 | Issue 1 Article 6
1991
The Failure of Felix Frankfurter
Melvin I. Urofsky
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.richmond.edu/lawreview
Part of the Judges Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School Journals at UR Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in
University of Richmond Law Review by an authorized editor of UR Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
scholarshiprepository@richmond.edu.
Recommended Citation
Melvin I. Urofsky, The Failure of Felix Frankfurter, 26 U. Rich. L. Rev. 175 (1991).
Available at: http://scholarship.richmond.edu/lawreview/vol26/iss1/6
THE FAILURE OF FELIX FRANKFURTER
Melvin I. Urofsky*
There is, unfortunately, no way one can predict whether a per-
son appointed to the Supreme Court will be a great justice or a
mediocre one. The nomination of John Marshall, for example,
evoked numerous complaints about his lack of ability. The Phila-
delphia Aurora characterized him as "more distinguished as a
rhetorician and sophist than as a lawyer and statesman," and the
Senate, in fact, delayed its confirmation vote for a week hoping
President John Adams would change his mind.' When Woodrow
Wilson appointed Louis D. Brandeis to the Court in 1916, pillars of
the bar crowded into the Senate judiciary sub-committee hearings
to denounce Brandeis as "unfit" to sit on the nation's highest
court.2
On the other hand, some appointees who gave much promise of
greatness have proven disappointing. Harlan Fiske Stone, for ex-
ample, had been so praised as an associate justice in the 1930's
that Franklin Roosevelt elevated him to chief justice in 1941.
Stone, however, proved a disaster in the center chair and could not
control an increasingly fractious bench. Perhaps the greatest dis-
appointment in the high court was Felix Frankfurter, appointed to
succeed Benjamin Nathan Cardozo in 1938. Many held high hopes
that he would become the intellectual leader of the Court; instead,
he proved a divisive figure whose jurisprudential philosophy is all
but ignored today. What happened to this man whom Brandeis
once called "the most useful lawyer in the United States? '4
This article suggests that Frankfurter's failure can be traced in
* Professor of History, Virginia Commonwealth University; B.A., 1961, Columbia Univer-
sity; Ph.D., 1968, Columbia University; J.D., 1983, University of Virginia.
1. CHARLES WARREN, 1 THE SuPREME COURT IN UNrIED STATES HISTORY 177-82 (rev. ed.
1935). Adams, however, believing Marshall would in fact be a great justice later declared
that "my gift of John Marshall to the people of the United States was the proudest act of
my life." Id. at 178.
2. ALDEN L. TODD, JUSTICE ON TRIAL: THE CASE OF Louis D. BRANDEIS ch. 5 (1964); see
also ALPHEUS T. MASON, BRANDEIS: A FREE MAN'S LIFE chs. 30-31 (1946).
3. ALPHEUS T. MASON, HARLAN FIsE STONE: PILLAR OF THE LAW pt. 6 (1956).
4. Letter from L.D. Brandeis to Harold Laski (Nov. 29, 1927), reprinted in BRUCE MUR-
PHY, THE BRANDEIs/FRANKFURTER CONNECTION 43 (1982).
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part to his abrasive personality and inability to get along with
other members of the Court. More importantly, he became a pris-
oner of jurisprudential views that he had developed and solidified
during his tenure as professor at the Harvard Law School. That
mindset was a response to a particular set of circumstances and
conditions that had begun to change dramatically, even before
Frankfurter took his seat on the Court in early 1939.
I. A NEW DEAL APPOINTMENT
On January 4, 1939, shortly after Franklin D. Roosevelt sent the
Senate the nomination of Felix Frankfurter as Associate Justice of
the United States Supreme Court, a group of top New Dealers
gathered to celebrate in the office of Secretary of the Interior, Har-
old L. Ickes. Attorney General Frank Murphy came, as did Missy
LeHand and Harry Hopkins; Tommy Corcoran brought two mag-
nums of champagne, and the chairman of the Securities and Ex-
change Commission, William 0. Douglas, rounded out the party.
All of them heartily agreed with Ickes, who described the nomina-
tion as "the most significant and worthwhile thing the President
had done.''5
Liberals in the government, academics, and the general commu-
nity joined in celebratory praise. The New Republic, with which
Frankfurter had been associated since its founding, naturally
cheered; it noted his "abhorrence of the second rate in thought or
action," and termed him the "ideal choice" to fill the chair once
held by Holmes and Cardozo.6 The Nation exalted: "Frankfurter's
whole life has been a preparation for the Supreme Court," and "his
appointment has an aesthetically satisfying inevitability. No other
appointee in our history has gone to the court so fully prepared for
its great tasks."'7 Archibald MacLeish, a close friend, proclaimed
that Frankfurter's great devotion to civil liberties, as evidenced
over the previous twenty years, would mark his tenure on the
bench." Many conservatives also applauded the appointment. The
New York Times commented approvingly that "he [would] serve
no narrow prejudices, that he [would] be free from partisanship,
[and] that he [would] reveal the organic conservatism through
5. HAROLD L. ICKES, 2 THE SECRET DIARIES OF HAROLD L. IcKEs 552 (1954).
6. Mr. Justice Frankfurter, Naw REPUBLIC, Jan. 18, 1939, at 297.
7. Justice Frankfurter, THE NATION, Jan. 14, 1939, at 52.
8. Archibald MacLeish, Foreword to LAW AND POLITICS: OCCASIONAL PAPERS OF FELIX
FRANKFURTER, 1913-1938 (Archibald MacLeish & E.F. Prichard, Jr., eds., 1939).
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which the hard-won victories [which] won liberty in the past
[could] yield a new birth of freedom."'
Frankfurter's supporters, who had mounted an extensive cam-
paign to put him on the Court,10 expected that he would assume
the intellectual leadership of the Court. Harold Ickes believed that
Frankfurter's appointment would solidify Roosevelt's "Supreme
Court victory." Regardless of who would be President after
Roosevelt, there would now be "aggressive, forthright and intelli-
gent leadership."" While Roosevelt mulled over the nomination,
Ickes told the President that Frankfurter's "ability and learning
are such that he [would] dominate the Supreme Court for fifteen
or twenty years to come."' 2 Solicitor General Robert H. Jackson, in
a sentiment echoed by Harlan Stone, claimed that only Frank-
furter had the legal resources "to face Chief Justice Hughes in con-
ference and hold his own in the discussion.' 3
There is no question that Frankfurter exerted a powerful influ-
ence during his twenty-three years on the bench. On his eightieth
birthday, which followed soon after his retirement from the Court,
the Harvard Law Review dedicated an issue to him. In that issue,
Frankfurter's colleague, John Marshall Harlan, asserted confi-
dently that Frankfurter's career on the bench need not await the
judgment of future historians; rather, "[h]e [would] surely be num-
bered among that select group of 'greats' who have sat in that
tribunal."' 4
Harlan's judgment seemed to have been born out nearly a dec-
ade later in a unique poll taken in 1970 of sixty-five professors of
law, history, and government regarding whom they considered the
best and the worst of the ninety-seven justices who had served
from 1789 through the retirement of Earl Warren in 1969. In that
poll, Frankfurter rated among the twelve "greats," along with John
Marshall, Joseph Story, Oliver Wendell Holmes, Louis Brandeis,
and Hugo Black.1 5
9. Felix Frankfurter, NEw YORK TIMES, Jan. 6, 1939, at 20, col. 2.
10. See MICHAEL E. PARRISH, FELIX FRANKFURTER AND His TIMEs 274-76 (1982); FROM THE
DIARIES OF FELIX FRANKFURTER 63-64 (Joseph P. Lash, ed., 1975).
11. ICKES, supra note 5, at 552.
12. Id. at 540.
13. EUGENE C. GERHART, AMERICA'S ADVOCATE: ROBERT H. JACKSON 165 (1958); MASON
supra note 3, at 482.
14. John M. Harlan, The Frankfurter Imprint as Seen by a Colleague, 76 HARv. L. REv.
1, 2 (1962).
15. ALBERT P. BLAUSTEIN & Roy M. MERSKY, THE FIRST ONE HUNDRED JUSTICES: STATISTI-
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In the balloting, only John Marshall received a "great ranking"
from all of those polled. Brandeis received sixty-two votes, Holmes
sixty-one and Black forty-two. Although the authors did not report
how many of the respondents rated Frankfurter as "great," they
did note that he received a number of "average" votes and "one of
the raters graded Frankfurter with a surprising 'failure.' "e16 The
unidentified professor who rated Frankfurter a failure commented
on the Justice's "preoccupation" with judicial restraint. He be-
lieved that Frankfurter's abilities had been "consistently over-
rated" and that he "had used his brilliance to restrict the develop-
ment of the law."'17
One should note, however, that even William 0. Douglas, who
shared this view of Frankfurter, nonetheless put him on the "All-
American" team, drawn from the men he had sat with in his
thirty-six years on the Court.'" Shortly before his death, Douglas
told James Simon that "Felix belonged on this Court. He knew
constitutional history and he knew this Court. He was a brilliant
advocate of his conservative philosophy."' 9
Evaluating justices, of course, is very much a function of the
time and of those who do the evaluation. In the case of this poll, in
1970 a general negative reaction had set in to the judicial activism
of the Warren Court, and even liberal academics believed that the
Court should show more judicial restraint. Interestingly, a majority
of the sixty-five members of the panel20 had been educated during
the 1930's and 1940's, a time when Frankfurter's views were identi-
cal to those prevalent in the law schools. As times change, so often
do our views of greatness, not only in jurisprudence 2' but in art
CAL STUDIES ON THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 37 (1978). The other members of
this top group were Roger B. Taney, John M. Harlan I, Charles Evans Hughes, Harlan Fiske
Stone, Benjamin N. Cardozo, and Earl Warren. Portions of the study first appeared in Al-
bert P. Blaustine & Roy M. Mersky, Rating Supreme Court Justices, 58 A.B.A. J. 1183
(1972).
16. BLAUSTINE & MEESKY, supra note 15, at 40 (the categories used were "great," "near-
great," "average," "below average," and "failure").
17. Id. at 44.
18. WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS, THE COURT YEAns, 1939-1975, at 42 (1981).
19. JAMES F. SIMON, INDEPENDENT JOURNEY: THE LIFE OF WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS 8 (1980).
20. The panelists are listed in BLAUSTEIN & MERSKY, supra note 15, Tbl. 4, at 117-18.
21. For a good example of changing reputation, see G. Edward White, The Rise and Fall
of Justice Holmes, 39 U. CHI. L. RE v. 51 (1971). It should be noted that although White
reports a declining reputation for Holmes, the Blaustein-Mersky poll, taken a year earlier,
listed Holmes among the "greats." White's sampling of writers differs significantly, and the
more recent and critical articles he cited were written by younger scholars just coming into
their own. As for judicial "reputation," there has not been a great deal written on the sub-
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and other fields as well; one wonders what would be the results of a
poll taken in 1991, of men and women, white and black, who had
been educated in the 1960's and 1970's.
Perhaps a more accurate method of evaluating justices and their
greatness is through examining their lasting influence. For exam-
ple, the Court still relies on Chief Justice Marshall's opinion in
Marbury v. Madison22 for justification of judicial review, and both
liberals and conservatives cite Brandeis's dissent in Olmstead v.
United States2= as justification for protecting privacy. By this
standard, few of Frankfurter's opinions have had a lasting
impact.24
II. A PROFESSORIAL JUSTICE
To be an effective leader, especially in the collegial atmosphere
of the Supreme Court, the justices must be able to get along with
one another. Frankfurter certainly knew this as well as anyone, as
he had this lesson driven home time and again in conversations
with Louis D. Brandeis in the 1920's and 1930's.15 Frankfurter
could be the most charming of persons, an ebullient conversation-
alist who, as his longtime friend and former student Dean Acheson
once wrote, had "a genius for friendship. '26
When Frankfurter took his seat on the high court in early 1939,
he did so with the air of a veteran rather than that of a novice side
judge. Frankfurter had studied the Court for years, and from his
extensive contacts with Holmes, Brandeis, Stone, and Cardozo,
knew the institution inside and out.27 He not only studied the writ-
ten opinions, but the interaction of the judges, as well as the wider
ject. The one significant exception is found in RICHARD POSNER, CARozo: A STUDY IN REPU-
TATION (1990).
22. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
23. 277 U.S. 438, 471 (1928).
24. In an admittedly unscientific survey, I checked several of the leading casebooks in
criminal procedure, federal court jurisdiction, administrative law and constitutional law, and
found practically no Frankfurter opinions among the leading cases. In fact, in some in-
stances, a Frankfurter opinion is either reprinted or referenced to indicate that the law is no
longer what he claimed it to be.
25. Melvin I. Urofsky, The Brandeis-Frankfurter Conversations, 1985 SuP. CT. REv. 299
(1985).
26. Dean Acheson, Felix Frankfurter, 76 HARv. L. REv. 14 (1962)..
27. In fact, Frankfurter co-authored the first extensive analysis of the Supreme Court as
an institution, and it remained the definitive work on the subject for many years. See FELx
FRANKFURTER & JAMis M. LANDIs, THE BusiNSss OF THE SUPREME CoURt. A STUDY IN THE
FEDERAL JUDIcIAL SYSTEM (1927).
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range of administrative and procedural concerns. 8 He claimed to
possess a greater understanding of the Court than those who were
members. "Not even as powerful and agile a mind as that of
Charles Evans Hughes," Frankfurter told Stanley Reed, "could,
under the pressures which produced adjudication and opinion writ-
ing, gain that thorough and disinterested grasp of these problems
which twenty-five years of academic preoccupation with the prob-
lem should have left in one."29
Even before going on the bench, he had been asked to assist
Hugo Black, a new member of the Court, in understanding the
proper judicial protocols. Black's tradition-ignoring dissents wor-
ried Brandeis and Stone, who invited Frankfurter to have a chat
with their new colleague. Frankfurter gladly did so, and reported
back that while the Alabaman was not "technically equipped" for
the job, he had a "good head" and was "capable of learning if...
rightly encouraged." 0
Once on the bench, Frankfurter believed he had an obligation to
instruct his brethren. Just as he had "helped" Black and taught a
generation of Harvard law students, he shared his knowledge and
experience with his fellow justices. Many of them, especially in
their first months on the bench, no doubt welcomed all the help
they could get - but Frankfurter never knew when to stop. Conse-
quently, when men whom he believed should be grateful for his
offers of help indicated their resentment at his continuing pa-
tronization, he could become downright nasty. One of the great
tragedies of Frankfurter's career is that a man renowned for his
talents in personal relations, who knew so well the high value the
justices placed on careful collegiality, could so terribly misread the
situation and the characters of those with whom he served.
Frankfurter could never, for example, shake the professorial
mindset. In fact, he believed it part of his strength as a judge. "I
am an academic," he told Stanley Reed, "and I have no excuse for
being on this Court unless I remain so."'" In a letter to Robert
28. Alexander Bickel, Applied Politics and the Science of Law: Writings of the Harvard
Period, in FELIX FRANKFURTER A TRmuTE 164, 197 (Wallace Mendelson ed., 1964).
29. Letter from Felix Frankfurter to Stanley Reed (Dec. 2, 1941) in Felix Frankfurter
Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.
30. MASON, supra note 3, at 469-70; Letter from Felix Frankfurter to Louis Brandeis
(May 28, 1938) in Felix Frankfurter Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress,
Washington, D.C.
31. Letter from Felix Frankfurter to Stanley Reed (Dec. 2, 1941), in Felix Frankfurter
Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.
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Jackson in which Frankfurter expounded at length on a point of
law, he concluded that "[i]f all this sounds to you professorial,
please remember that I am a professor unashamed." 2 Mr. Justice
Frankfurter carried this professorial air into conference, where
Chief Justice Hughes called him "Professor Frankfurter." 3 There,
Frankfurter tended to lecture his fellow justices constantly quoting
Holmes and Brandeis to buttress his argument, instead of treating
his fellow justices as colleagues. Ironically, Justice William Bren-
nan commented, "[w]e would be inclined to agree with Felix more
often in conference . . . if he quoted Holmes less frequently to
us." 34 Justice Potter Stewart recalled that if Felix were really in-
terested in a case, "he . . . would speak for fifty minutes, no more
or less, because that was the length of the lecture at the Harvard
Law School."'3 5
In conference, Frankfurter could often be as abrasive and conde-
scending as he had been in the classroom. For example, "[i]t is the
lot of professors to be often not understood by pupils," he wrote
Stanley Reed after Reed failed to grasp a point of law expounded
by Frankfurter, "[s]o let me try again."36 Another time he told
Reed that he taught Harvard students that in order to construe a
statute correctly, they should read it not once but three times. He
then advised Reed to go back and reread the law.37
Frankfurter could become splenetic when he did not get his way.
For example, while he considered Frank Murphy a man of princi-
ple, he constantly fumed about Murphy's desire to do justice and
write compassion into the law rather than to follow Frankfurter's
example of judicial restraint. He charged Murphy with being "too
subservient" to his "notions of doing 'the right thing,'" and some-
times addressed Murphy as "Dear god." In a note passed to Mur-
phy during the 1944 term, Frankfurter listed as among Murphy's
clients "'Reds', Whores, Crooks, Indians and all other colored peo-
ple, Longshoremen, M'tgors [Mortgagors] and other Debtors, R.R.
Employees, Pacifists, Traitors, Japs, Women, Children and Most
Men." "Must I become a Negro rapist," he complained, "before
32. Letter from Felix Frankfurter to Robert H. Jackson (Jan. 29, 1953) reprinted in BER-
NARD SCHWARTZ, SUPER CHIEF: EARL WARREN AND His SuPRE!tE COURT 39 (1985).
33. SINEY FINm, FRANK MURPHY: THE WASHINGTON YEARS 159 (1984).
34. Dennis Hutchinson, Felix Fraikfurter and the Business of the Supreme Court, O.T.
1946-0.T. 1961, 1980 Sup. CT. REv. 143, 205 (1980).
35. BERNARD SCHWARTZ & STEPHAN LESHER, INSIDE THE WARREN COURT 24 (1983).
36. FINE, supra note 33, at 159.
37. Id.
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you give me due process? '38
Frankfurter's intellectual arrogance, combined with a nastiness
some of his students had seen years earlier, led him to alienate
nearly all of his colleagues at one time or another. He would flatter
them so long as they agreed with him; but, at the first sign of inde-
pendent thought, he would explode. During his tenure on the
bench, no one - with the possible exception of Robert Jackson -
escaped his scorn. Typical are the comments he scribbled on an
opinion by Wiley Rutledge that went against his advice: "if I had
to expose all your fallacies I would have to write a short book on
(1) federal jurisdiction (2) constitutional law [and] (3) procedure
generally."' 9 In another instance, Frankfurter told Learned Hand
that Hugo Black "[was] a self-righteous, self-deluded part fanatic,
part demagogue, who really disbelieve[d] in Law, [and thought] it
[was] essentially manipulation of language. "40
According to one biographer, after the "siege" of his first five
years on the bench, Frankfurter "mentally divide[d] his colleagues
into three categories - adversaries, allies, and potential allies."'41
Unfortunately, the pattern might better be described in the view-
point of the judges still friendly or already alienated by Frank-
furter's treatment of them.
For example, Frankfurter, at first, expressed great enthusiasm
for Earl Warren, whom he believed to be a clever politician (who
could, therefore, protect the Court as Taft and Hughes had done),
but somewhat weak in the law, and thus open to his tutelage. He
also assumed that William J. Brennan, Jr., a former student of his
at Harvard, would be open to his suggestions. 42 Frankfurter never
seemed to learn or to stop hoping. He repeated the same pattern of
flattery, attention, cajoling, and endless attempts at instruction 43
38. FINE, supra note 33, at 258-59.
39. Id. at 255.
40. Letter from Felix Frankfurter to Learned Hand (Nov. 5, 1954), reprinted in SMNEY
FINE, FRANK MURPHY: THE WASHINGTON YEARS 251 (1984).
41. H.N. HIRSCH, THE ENIGMA OF FELIX FRANKFURTER 177 (1981).
42. See, for example, the semi-humorous memo addressed to "Mr. Justice of New Jersey,"
who may one day become "Mr. Justice of the United States," as soon as he recognizes it is
the U.S. Constitution and not New Jersey law that governs at the federal level. Letter from
Felix Frankfurter to William Brennan (Oct. 25, 1957), Felix Frankfurter Papers, Harvard
Law School Library, Cambridge, Massachusetts.
43. To take but one example, shortly after he went on the Court Warren asked if Frank-
furter could recommend a book or an article on a particular point of law. Two hours later a
clerk wheeled in a cart loaded with several dozen volumes and a note from Frankfurter
stating once Warren had read through these, he would understand the issue. In contrast,
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to no avail.
As Warren grew accustomed to the Court, he relied more on his
own judgment and began to resent Frankfurter's constant stream
of advice. "All Felix does is talk, talk, talk," Warren told his col-
leagues. "He drives you crazy!"'44 Within three years, the new Chief
Justice moved from a centrist position in the Court's makeup to
alignment with the liberal wing, and for this he earned Frank-
furter's condemnation.45 In a letter to Learned Hand in 1957, a
bitter Frankfurter lumped Warren with Black and Douglas as men
whose "common denominator [was] a self-willed self-righteous
power-lust," and as men "undisciplined by adequate professional
learning and cultivated understanding" who made decisions on the
basis of "their prejudices and their respective pasts and self-con-
scious desires to join Thomas Paine and T. Jefferson in the Val-
halla of 'liberty' and in the meantime to have the avant-garde of
the Yale Law School ... praise them! '46
III. AN ARROGANT JUSTICE
Even when Frankfurter had constructive comments to make, his
didactic manner rubbed the brethren the wrong way, especially
Douglas. As Dennis Hutchinson has shown, Frankfurter began
making suggestions for improving and strengthening Court proce-
dures around 1946. At the beginning of every term he would circu-
late a lengthy memorandum enumerating and explaining his pro-
posed changes. One can recognize in one section of the 1956 term
memorandum all the irritating features discussed above:
Even before I came on the Court, I had good reason to believe that
when Warren asked Black if he could recommend anything that would help him to improve
his writing, Black sent over a single volume, a work by Aristotle. Interview with Gerald
Gunther, clerk to Earl Warren during the October 1954 Term (Aug. 1989).
44. G. EDWARD WHITE, EARL WARREN: A PUBLic LIFE 179 (1982); SCHWARTZ, supra note
32, at 25-27.
45. See Bernard Schwartz, Felix Frankfurter and Earl Warren: A Study of a Deteriorat-
ing Relationship, 1980 Sup. CT. REv. 115 (1980).
46. Letter from Felix Frankfurter to Learned Hand (June 30, 1957), reprinted in G. ED-
WARD WHrrE, EARL WARREN: A PUBLIC LnE 181 (1982). Interestingly enough, Frankfurter's
hero, Louis Brandeis, was a great admirer of Jefferson. After a visit to Monticello, Brandeis
wrote to Frankfurter: "I have spent a day at Charlottesville to see Monticello & the Univer-
sity. It is strong confirmation that T.J. was greatly civilized. Washington, Jefferson, Frank-
lin, Hamilton were indeed a Big Four." Letter from Louis Brandeis to Felix Frankfurter
(Sept. 22, 1927), Felix Frankfurter Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Wash-
ington, D.C.
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the course of proceeding leading to adjudication was not all that it
might be. My grounds for feeling that the deliberative process was
inadequate derived from the intimacies I had enjoyed over the years
with Justices Holmes, Brandeis, and Cardozo. 47
In his "October greeting" for the 1960 term, he suggested several
changes that he thought would improve and speed up the voting
and announcement procedures. In particular he wanted the per
curiam decisions issued immediately, rather than allowing a single
justice to hold up the announcement if he wanted to think about it
some more; Frankfurter then asked for a conference to discuss his
proposals. William 0. Douglas, who by then had little patience for
Frankfurter, 8 printed and circulated the following answer:
With all due respect, I vote against a meeting to discuss the p5ropos-
als. The virtue of our present procedures is that they are very flexi-
ble. If anyone wants a per curiam held over, it is always held. If
anyone wants to pass and not vote on a case until a later conference,
his wish is always respected. If anyone wants to circulate a memo-
randum stating his views on a case, the memo is always welcome. If
we unanimously adopted rules on such matters we would be plagued
by them, bogged down, and interminably delayed. If we were not
unanimous, the rules would be ineffective. I, for one, could not agree
to give anyone any more control over when I vote than over how I
vote.
... We need not put ourselves in the needless harness that is
proposed. 41
When Frankfurter renewed the suggestion the following year,
Douglas expressed his continued opposition in even stronger
terms.
51
As Professor Hutchinson notes, despite the existence of a num-
ber of worthwhile ideas in these annual memoranda, Frankfurter's
47. Hutchinson, supra note 34, at 182-83.
48. The mutual dislike between the two is explored in Melvin I. Urofsky, Conflict Among
the Brethren: Felix Frankfurter, William 0. Douglas and the Clash of Personalities and
Philosophies on the United States Supreme Court, 1988 DUKE L.J. 71 (1988).
49. Memorandum from William 0. Douglas to Conference, October 13, 1960, reprinted in
THE DOUGLAS LETTERS: SELECTIONS FROM THE PRIVATE PAPERS OF JUSTICE WILLIAM 0. DOUG-
LAS 89 (Melvin I. Urofsky ed., 1987).
50. Memorandum of William 0. Douglas to Conference (Oct. 23, 1961), reprinted in THE
DOUGLAS LETTERS: SELECTIONS FROM THE PRIVATE PAPERS OF JUSTICE WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS 89
n.1 (Melvin I. Urofsky ed., 1987).
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abrasiveness often prevented a fair hearing. For example, Frank-
furter often held up decisions for weeks and even months as he
laboriously prepared his elaborate opinions. At the end of the 1948
term, Douglas (who always wrote quickly) complained about delays
and suggested that a case should be reassigned if a justice holds up
his opinion more than three months after the case has been de-
cided at conference. "I do not think," he told the brethren, "in
fairness to each other and the litigants, one of us [Frankfurter]
should be allowed to serve his own personal ends by holding cases
beyond that time."51
Once again Frankfurter, who prided himself on understanding
the importance of personal relations and individuality on the
Court, misjudged the issue. His proposal can be seen as part of his
emphasis on procedure, on getting the rules and the process right,
and in his belief that the right procedure always will produce the
right result. Douglas's chilly response is undoubtedly correct, in
that judging can not always be girdled by rules, that there has to
be room for flexibility, for the accommodation of a justice's second
thoughts, to rethink and perhaps rediscuss a difficult issue rather
than rushing to judgment because of an artificially imposed time
limit.
Undoubtedly, tension existed between Frankfurter and his
strong-willed colleagues on the nation's highest court. Other jus-
tices, however, holding equally strong views, have managed to re-
main on civil and even cordial terms with associates adhering to
diametrically opposite opinions. With the exception of the anti-Se-
mitic McReynolds, Brandeis got along well with the conservatives
who dominated the Court during most of his twenty-three year
tenure. In recent years William Rehnquist could not have been fur-
ther apart doctrinally from William Brennan, yet the two got along
quite well. Frankfurter, for all that he could be, charming, solici-
tous, witty and outgoing, was also duplicitous and conniving. These
latter characteristics triggered confrontation.
Frankfurter tended to divide the world into disciples and men-
tors. While possibly an appropriate attitude for a professor, it
boded ill when he had to deal with persons who did not care to be
treated as students. For example, this attitude led to a break be-
tween Frankfurter and two of his most gifted prot6g6s, Ben Cohen
51. Memorandum from William 0. Douglas to Conference, June 15, 1949, reprinted in
SIDNEY FINE, FRANK MURPHY: THE WASHINGTON YEARS 254 (1984).
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and Thomas Corcoran, who after seven years of doing top-level
work for the President of the United States, refused to be treated
any more as two of Frankfurter's brighter students. "Felix is inca-
pable of having adult relationships!" Cohen complained; Frank-
furter could relate well to his mentors and his students, but not to
his peers.52
IV. AN ANALYTICAL JUSTICE
Besides personalities, far more basic an ingredient in Frank-
furter's ineffectiveness as a justice were the philosophical differ-
ences in fundamental issues, such as judicial restraint and the in-
corporation of the Bill of Rights, that split the Court in the early
1940's and have still not been fully resolved today. One can charac-
terize the division between the Frankfurter and the Black/Douglas
views in several ways - restraint versus activism, process versus
results, and even Yale versus Harvard, for both Frankfurter and
Douglas started down their respective jurisprudential paths during
the academic stages of their careers.
Frankfurter long venerated Holmes and Brandeis for their call to
judges to refrain from allowing their own economic prejudices to
overrule the proper policymaking role of elected officials. As a pro-
fessor, Frankfurter championed the Holmes/Brandeis view. In his
writings and classes he had advocated judicial restraint as a basic
element of a proper jurisprudential credo. One of his students,
Louis L. Jaffe, wrote that Frankfurter could not be characterized
as either a conservative or a liberal: "It is of the very essence of his
judicial philosophy that his role as a judge precludes him from
having a program couched in these terms of choice. '5' Frank-
furter's close friend and colleague at Harvard, Thomas Reed Pow-
ell, defended Frankfurter when former admirers claimed he had
forsaken the liberal path. Powell suggested that one facet of liber-
alism in a judge, "may be the insistence that courts should not
interpose their vetoes except under the strongest constitutional
compulsions." 54
Frankfurter's study of constitutional development, which em-
52. BRUCE MURPHY, THE BRANDEIs/FRANKFURTER CONNECTION 191 (1982).
53. Louis L. Jaffe, The Judicial Universe of Mr. Justice Frankfurter, 62 HARV. L. REV.
357, 358 (1949).
54. Thomas Reed Powell, Judicial Protection of Civil Rights, 29 IOWA L. REV. 383, 395
(1944).
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phasized process, led him to believe that courts should limit their
jurisdiction to matters of public law. He was not so naive to believe
that personality and prejudice played no role in court decisions,
but felt judges had the obligation to work earnestly to keep their
personal considerations from affecting their decisions. A critic
claimed that while at Harvard, Professor Frankfurter worried over
each case he taught like a terrier, exploring every minute matter of
history, procedure, and philosophy, losing sight of the larger. policy
issues involved.56 A fairer view may be gleaned from what Powell
wrote of his own teaching:
My emphasis is on process, process, process, on particularities, par-
ticularities, on cases, cases, cases, on the contemporary court, on
resolving competing considerations, on watching for practicalities
not likely to be expressed in opinions in which the Court pretends
that the case is being decided by its predecessors rather than by
itself.57
This coldly analytical method, Frankfurter believed, allowed courts
and students to let reason triumph over emotion. "I have a roman-
tic belief in Reason," he told Black. He told Jackson that "one
drawback of a professor is that he does believe in reason and pro-
foundly believes that the mode by which results are reached is as
important - maybe more important - in the evolution of society
as the result itself.' '1 8 (Frankfurter might have profited if he had
kept in mind a little aphorism he once quoted to Powell that logic
"is the art of going wrong with confidence. ' 59)
I A major problem with Frankfurter's claim of rational objectivity,
of course, is that Frankfurter lacked the Olympian detachment of
Holmes or the steely discipline of Brandeis to keep his emotions in
55. "It's easy to write opinions," Frankfurter told a friend, "if one only writes what one
thinks is right. But here, I suppose, naivet6 is not a virtue but a handicap, or, at best, a
habit." Letter from Felix Frankfurter to Thomas Reed Powell (Jan. 29, 1941), Powell Pa-
pers, Harvard Law School Library, Cambridge, Massachusetts.
56. Fred Rodell, Felix Frankfurter, Conservative, HARPER'S MAG., Oct. 1941, 449, 453.
57. LAURA KALMAN, LEGAL REALISM AT YALE, 1927-1960, at 51 (1986).
58. Letter from Felix Frankfurter to Jackson (Feb. 23 1944), Felix Frankfurter Papers,
Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. Frankfurter captioned this let-
ter, which dealt with a question of statutory interpretation, "Some Reflections of an
Unashamed Professor."
59. NGAIO MARSH, DEATH AT THE BAR (1940) (quoted in letter from Felix Frankfurter to
Thomas Reed Powell (May 6, 1940), Powell Papers, Harvard Law School Library, Cam-
bridge, Massachusetts).
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check.6 ° He had strong feelings; one friend, for example, called him
"a passionate person, who ha[d] given up the other passions of his
life for this one - the institution of the Court."6' 1 Douglas claimed
that Charles Evans Hughes said that judges based their decisions
ninety percent on emotions. Frankfurter, upon hearing this, de-
nounced the idea, but Douglas noted "no one poured his emotions
more completely into decisions, [than Frankfurter] while profess-
ing just the opposite. '62
We can examine this confluence of alleged rationality and emo-
tion, of adherence to judicial restraint and ignorance of changing
circumstances, in three groups of cases: the flag salute cases de-
cided early in Frankfurter's career on the Court;" the Communist
speech cases midway through;6 4 and the apportionment cases at
the end of his tenure on the bench. 5
V. THE FIRST AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS
The 1940 flag salute case66 presented no new questions to either
the Court or to Frankfurter. Whether or not a state could compel
school children to salute the American flag had been an issue in
twenty states between 1935 and 1940, and had been the subject of
major litigation in seven. Prior to Minersville School District v.
Gobitis, the United States Supreme Court had upheld state court
decisions validating compulsory flag salute laws four times.67 Jeho-
vah's Witnesses objected to the flag salute because of their literal
reading of Exodus 20:4-5, and their equation of the salute with
bowing down to graven images.
Frankfurter, a naturalized American citizen who always took ide-
als of citizenship and patriotism very seriously, had little sympathy
with those who, as he saw it, refused to meet their civic obligations.
In a memorandum to Secretary of War Newton D. Baker in Sep-
tember 1918, Frankfurter condemned conscientious objectors who
60. For the striking temperamental differences between Holmes and Frankfurter, see
Lash, supra note 10, at 77. Frankfurter himself admitted that he lacked Brandeis's "auster-
ity." Letter from Felix Frankfurter to Thomas R. Powell (Feb. 13, 1942), Powell Papers,
Harvard Law School Library, Cambridge, Massachusetts.
61. BERNARD SCHWARTZ, SUPER CHIEF: EARL WARREN AND His SUPREME COURT 40 (1985).
62. DOUGLAS, supra note 18, at 33-34.
63. See infra notes 66-110 and accompanying text.
64. See infra notes 111-144 and accompanying text.
65. See infra notes 145-159 and accompanying text.
66. Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940).
67. FINE, supra note 33, at 185.
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refused to do even noncombatant service, suggesting they "be
turned over to the Fort Leavenworth authorities for treatment."68
Frankfurter apparently saw no trampling of First Amendment
rights and, during oral argument of the case on April 25, 1940,
passed a note to Frank Murphy questioning whether the Framers
of the Bill of Rights "would have thought that a requirement to
salute the flag violate[d] the protection of 'the free exercise of reli-
gion?' "69 Chief Justice Hughes assigned the opinion to Frank-
furter, who circulated a draft in May. Douglas, who later intimated
that he might have voted the other way had Stone circulated his
dissent earlier,70 endorsed not only Frankfurter's original draft, but
the final version as well. "This is a powerful moving document of
incalculable contemporary and (I believe) historical value," he
wrote, terming the opinion "a truly statesmanlike job." He scrib-
bled a similar encomium on the recirculation. 1
In his opinion for the eight to one majority, Frankfurter framed
the "precise" issue in terms of judicial restraint and called upon
the Court to defer to the wisdom and prerogatives of local school
authorities:
To stigmatize legislative judgment in providing for this universal
gesture of respect for the symbol of our national life in the setting of
the common school as a lawless inroad on that freedom of con-
science which the Constitution protects, would amount to no less
than the pronouncement of pedagogical and psychological dogma in
a field where courts possess no marked and certainly no controlling
competence .... [T]o the legislature no less than to courts is com-
mitted the guardianship of deeply cherished liberties.72
There is almost a formulaic quality about the opinion that reap-
pears in many of Frankfurter's later decisions. First, is the legisla-
tive end legitimate? Here the answer appeared obvious; of course
school boards and the states have a real interest in promoting pa-
triotism and loyalty to the nation, of which the flag is the symbol.
Second, are the means chosen reasonable? If so, then it is not up to
the courts to say that a better way exists. Therefore, if the end is
68. MASON, supra note 3, at 514.
69. FINE, supra note 33, at 185.
70. DOUGLAS, supra note 18, at 45.
71. HmSCH, supra note 41, at 150.
72. Gobitis, 310 U.S. at 597-98, 600.
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legitimate and the means chosen are reasonable, the measure - in
this case the flag salute - is constitutional. Frankfurter paid
practically no attention to the Gobitis' claim that First Amend-
ment rights of free exercise of religion had been violated, and in a
nominal bow'to balancing, found national unity a far more pressing
matter.
74
One might stop for a moment and compare the Frankfurter ap-
proach in Gobitis to later First Amendment analysis. Where
Frankfurter's lead question was whether the state has a legitimate
interest, modern courts ask whether speech or free exercise rights
have been restricted. If yes, then the next question is whether the
state has a compelling interest to warrant that restriction. A
merely "legitimate" or even an "important" interest will not justify
violation of the First Amendment. If, however, the state does have
a compelling interest, then the courts ask whether the limitation
has been imposed in the least restrictive manner.
The difference between the two approaches is neither semantic
nor one of degree; it distinguishes between a view that sees regula-
tions of speech or religion in the same manner as economic rules,
and an approach that elevates the rights of the individual above
the administrative convenience of the state. In terms of balancing,
it places far greater weight on individual liberty than on any but
the most compelling governmental interest.
Only Harlan Fiske Stone dissented to the decision in Gobitis7 5
and much of the liberal press applauded his opinion and de-
nounced that of Frankfurter. Harold Laski, a close friend of Frank-
furter, wrote Stone to tell him "how right I think you are . . .
[and] how wrong I think Felix is."'7' Harold Ickes, recognizing
Frankfurter's concern about the war in Europe (the decision came
down during the Dunkirk evacuation), thought the opinion worse
than useless, "[a]s if the country can be saved, or our institutions
73. Gobitis, 310 U.S. at 597-98; see also Sanford V. Levinson, Skeptism, Democracy, and
Judicial Restraint: An Essay on the Thought of Oliver Wendell Holmes and Felix Frank-
furter 225-26 (1969) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University).
74. There is little question but that Frankfurter's own experience as an immigrant boy
Americanized in the New York public school system, and his intense patriotic fervor, played
a significant role in how he saw the facts of the two cases. For an interesting discussion of
this see Richard Danzig, Justice Frankfurter's Opinions in the Flag Salute Cases: Blending
Logic and Psychologic in Constitutional Decisionmaking, 36 STAN. L. REv. 675 (1984).
75. Gobitis, 310 U.S. at 601.
76. MASON, supra note 3, at 532.
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preserved, by forced salute of our flag by these fanatics. .... ,77
Frankfurter knew that the opinion troubled some of his friends
and seemed to run counter to his earlier reputation as a civil liber-
tarian. He wrote Alice Hamilton that he could appreciate her con-
cern: "after all, my life has not been dissociated from concern for
civil liberties. '78 In the files concerning the flag salute cases, there
is an undated memorandum in Frankfurter's handwriting that
reads: "No duty of judges is more important nor more difficult to
discharge than that of guarding against reading their personal and
debatable opinions into the Case." In this opinion, however,
Frankfurter certainly read into it his zealous love of country and
his belief that all other Americans should be just as patriotic as he.
Behind Gobitis, of course, was the whole issue of how far the
protection of the Bill of Rights extended to the states, and what
role the courts had in determining the limits of that protection.
Frankfurter's mentor and hero, Louis Brandeis, first intimated
that the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause could mean
protection of speech as well as property.79 By the 1930's, the doc-
trine of incorporation, as this idea came to be called, was accepted,
at least in principle, by the Court.80 Problems then arose in decid-
ing particulars, and here Frankfurter followed the guidelines set
down by another of his heroes, Benjamin N. Cardozo, in Palko v.
Connecticut.81 In Palko, Cardozo suggested that the Fourteenth
Amendment only incorporated those protections that were "of the
very essence of a scheme of ordered liberty"8 2 and "so rooted in the
traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as
fundamental. '8 3
Despite the eight to one vote, at least three members of the
Gobitis majority - Black, Douglas and Murphy - found them-
selves uncomfortable with Frankfurter's application of Palko. Mur-
phy was troubled by the decision from the start.8 4 Black did not
77. IcKEs, supra note 5, vol. 3, at 199.
78. Letter from Felix Frankfurter to Alice Hamilton (June 13, 1940), Papers of Felix
Frankfurter, Harvard Law' School Library, Cambridge, Massachusetts.
79. See Gilbert v. Minnesota, 254 U.S. 325, 334, 343 (1920) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
80. See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925) (speech); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S.
697 (1931) (press); and Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932) (right to counsel).
81. 302 U.S. 319 (1937).
82. Id. at 325.
83. Id. (citing Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934)).
84. FINE, supra note 33, at 185. Murphy had even prepared a dissent, but reluctantly
decided to go with the majority.
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like the law, but saw nothing in the Constitution to invalidate the
measure. When the Court convened after its summer recess, Doug-
las told Frankfurter that Black had had second thoughts about his
Gobitis vote. When Frankfurter asked if "Black had been reading
the Constitution," Douglas responded, "No - he has been reading
the papers." 5 In the newspapers Black, and everyone else, would
have noted the Justice Department reports which stated that in
the weeks following the decision there had been hundreds of at-
tacks on Jehovah's Witness members, especially in small towns
and rural areas, and that this pattern continued for at least two
years.
The three brooded over this situation and finally indicated their
feelings when the Court announced its decision in another Jeho-
vah's Witness case, Jones v. Opelika."6 In Opelika, the sect had
refused to pay a municipal licensing fee for peddlers prior to sell-
ing their religious tracts. The issue was essentially the same as in
Gobitis; the extent to which the government's acknowledged power
to maintain public order impinged on the free exercise of religion.
Frankfurter again voted with the majority in favor of the state,
but this time four judges dissented - Stone, Black, Douglas, and
Murphy. Moreover, in an unprecedented step, the latter three jus-
tices appended a statement acknowledging Opelika as a logical ex-
tension of Gobitis. They believed it "an appropriate occasion" to
confess they had been wrong in the earlier case, since the majority
opinion, as in Opelika, "put the right freely to exercise religion in a
subordinate position," in violation of the First Amendment. 1 This
recantation infuriated Frankfurter, who pointed out that Gobitis
had not been challenged in the Opelika litigation or even men-
tioned in conference.
In light of the spate of attacks on Jehovah's Witness members,
the apparent shift in Court sentiment, and the news of Hitler's
"Final Solution" of the Jewish question in Europe, the Court ac-
cepted another case dealing with required flag salutes and free ex-
ercise of religion. Both the American Bar Association Committee
on the Bill of Rights and the American Civil Liberties Union, a
rare tandem, filed amici briefs in support of the Jehovah's Witness
members. Justice Jackson, who hardly ever voted for minority
85. FINE, supra note 33, at 187.
86. 316 U.S. 584 (1942).
87. Id. at 623-24.
[Vol. 26:175
FELIX FRANKFURTER
rights against a public interest argument, this time joined the lib-
erals to strike down the mandatory salute. In fact, he wrote one of
the most eloquent opinions of his judicial career declaring that: "If
there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that
no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in
politics, nationalism, religion or other matters of opinion or force
citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein.'' s
Frankfurter's impassioned dissent, if taken literally, nearly de-
nies the Court any role in enforcing the Bill of Rights and seems to
warrant Douglas's denunciation of it in his memoirs. "The Frank-
furter philosophy was fully exposed," he wrote. "[A]lthough free
exercise of religion was guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth
Amendments, the legislature could nonetheless regulate it by in-
voking the concept of due process, provided they stayed within
reasonable limits.""9 Indeed, despite Frankfurter's comment that
he belonged to "the most vilified and persecuted minority in his-
tory,"' 0 he in fact dismissed judicial protection of minorities. The
Framers, he said, "knew that minorities may disrupt society." 91
Frankfurter worked for weeks on his dissent, and in apologizing
to Jackson for holding up the decision, he described his dissent as
"the expression of my credo regarding the function of this Court in
invalidating legislation."92 He reiterated the formula he had used
in the earlier decision that "this Court's only and very narrow
function is to determine whether within the broad grant of author-
ity vested in legislatures they have exercised a judgment for which
reasonable justification can be offered. '9 3
However, because of Jackson's eloquent depiction of the mean-
ing of free exercise of religion, Frankfurter could not pass over it as
lightly as he had in Gobitis. Instead he took a minimalist ap-
proach. The First Amendment provided "freedom from conformity
to religious dogma, not freedom from conformity to law because of
religious dogma."9 4 Claims of conscience by themselves could never
88. West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).
89. DOUGLAS, supra note 18, at 45.
90. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 646.
91. Id. at 653.
92. Letter from Felix Frankfurter to Robert H. Jackson (June 4, 1943), Papers of Felix
Frankfurter, Harvard Law School Library, Cambridge, Massachusetts. Frankfurter evi-
dently had a difficult time in writing the opinion, and as he told Jackson, "perhaps because
it is credo and not research that the expression of it is so recalcitrant." Id.
93. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 649.
94. Id. at 653.
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justify exemption from valid laws which have a reasonable basis.
Since, as Sanford Levinson points out, the state could always cre-
ate the nexus of a reasonable justification for its action, the courts
would never impose any serious review on state action.95
Frankfurter's pride in his dissent and the importance he at-
tached to it led him to an active extrajudicial campaign to publi-
cize his views. He sent copies to retired Chief Justice Hughes,9 6
and suggested to President Roosevelt that a copy be placed in the
Hyde Park library, since it would "furnish to the future historian
food for thought on the scope and meaning of some of the Four
Freedoms - their use and their misuse. '97 He wrote friends in the
press, such as Bruce Bliven of the New Republic and Frank
Buxton of the Boston Herald, pointing out that Learned Hand and
Louis Brandeis had agreed with his Gobitis opinion. But, he noted,
"those great libertarians," Black and Douglas, had also agreed "un-
til they heard from the people." ' 8
There is a bitter sadness here, due perhaps to Frankfurter's rec-
ognition that he had lost an opportunity to lead the Court down
the road of what he considered its proper jurisprudential role,
namely a limited jurisdiction in mediating among the elements of
the federal system. But one can also regret the failure of a man
who had studied the Court for over a quarter-century, a man who
in his own words "knew all there was to know . . . on what had
gone on behind the scenes," a man who had argued brilliantly
that the Court had to be sensitive to changes in the larger society
- only to allow his views to become so rigid as to deny him flexi-
bility or room for change and maheuver. 100
His heroes, Holmes and Brandeis, argued for judicial restraint,
95. Levinson, supra note 73, at 232.
96. See Letter from Felix Frankfurter to Charles Evans Hughes (June 15, 1943), Felix
Frankfurter Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.
97. Letter from Felix Frankfurter to Franklin D. Roosevelt (May 3, 1943), reprinted in
MAx FREEDMAN, ROOSEvELT & FRANKFURTER THEIR CORRESPONDENCE 1928-1945, at 699
(1967). Frankfurter must have sent the President an early draft of his dissent, since the final
decision did not come down for another month.
98. HIRSCH, supra note 41, at 175. However, see Hirsch's interesting footnote to this pas-
sage, indicating that Brandeis may not have been as supportive of the Gobitis opinion as
Frankfurter claimed. Id. at 243 n.190.
99. Lash, supra note 10, at 175 (diary entry dated Jan. 30, 1943).
100. Robert Burt sees the flag-salute cases as epitomizing Frankfurter's role as the out-
sider become insider, and that all he would offer to the Jehovah's Witnesses was an invita-
tion that they give up their absurd practices and become full-fledged Americans, as he had.
ROBERT A. BURT, Two JEWISH JUSTICES: OUTCASTS IN THE PROMISED LAND 44-45 (1988).
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but they did so in cases primarily involving economic questions.
Holmes, in Lochner v. New York,"I and Brandeis, in New State
Ice Co. v. Liebmann,'°' called upon courts not to interpose their
economic views in place of legislative policy. But Holmes and
Brandeis also initiated the modern jurisprudence of free speech.10 3
Brandeis was the first to suggest that the Fourteenth Amendment
incorporated parts of the Bill of Rights and that courts had a spe-
cial obligation to scrutinize legislative actions which restricted
those rights. 04 Another one of Frankfurter's judicial heroes, Benja-
min Nathan Cardozo, was the first to express the doctrine of incor-
poration in a systematic fashion,10 5 and Harlan Fiske Stone, in his
famous United States v. Carolene Products Co. footnote, 06 called
for a heightened level of review when basic rights were at stake.
The tragedy of Mr. Justice Frankfurter was that he became a pris-
oner of an idea - judicial restraint - and failed to distinguish
between the regulation of economic and property rights and limita-
tions upon individual liberties.
As for the charge that Douglas and Black "heard from the peo-
ple," one might recall Holmes's comment in Lochner that the case
had been decided "upon an economic theory which a large part of
the country does not entertain."'1 One might also note Brandeis's
famous talk on "the living law" and his charge that courts had
been "largely deaf and blind" to the great revolutionary changes
then taking place, and had "continued to ignore newly arisen social
needs."'' 0 Much of the agitation over the judicial system during
the Progressive Era resulted from popular perceptions that the
courts and the law had not kept up with the times. In Gobitis, the
Court made a mistake, 0 9 and in doing so, unleashed ugly passions
101. 198 U.S. 45, 74 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
102. 285 U.S. 262, 280 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
103. See PAUL L. MURPHY, WORLD WAR I AND THE ORIGINS OF CIVIL LIBERTIES IN THE
UNITED STATES 266 (1979). One might also compare Frankfurter's earlier comments on
Holmes and free speech, which can almost be read as implying that Holmes supported a
"preferred position" for First Amendment rights, and Frankfurter's own more cramped
views as expressed in the flag salute cases. FELIX FRANKFURTER, MR. JUSTICE HOLMES AND
THE SUPREME COURT 84-85 (1938).
104. Gilbert v. Minnesota, 254 U.S. 325, 334, 343 (1920) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
105. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 324-26 (1937).
106. 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
107. Lochner v. United States, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
108. Louis D. Brandeis, The Living Law, 10 ILL. L. REv. 461, 464 (1916).
109. Chief Justice Stone, in a conversation with writer Irving Brant, said (although not in
connection with Gobitis): "I believe the Court should correct its own errors, even when I
help to make them." MASON, supra note 3, at 589.
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and prejudices. That it rectified its error ought not to be seen as
pandering to popular tastes, but as a sign of strength and self-con-
fidence. The Court has, after all, adhered to other unpopular opin-
ions when it has believed them to be right.110
VI. THE RED SCARE, FREE SPEECH, AND THE RESTRAINED JUSTICE
In the spring of 1946, Winston Churchill stepped to the podium
of Westminster College in Fulton, Missouri, and, in describing con-
ditions in Europe, declared that "From Stettin in the Baltic to Tri-
este in the Adriatic an iron curtain has descended upon the Conti-
nent." Within an amazingly short time the Soviet Union, our ally
in the war against fascism, became our enemy, and the United
States would be engaged in a "cold war" against Russia for the
next four decades.
The fear of communist expansion triggered a new Red Scare in
the United States, one even worse than the hysteria following the
first World War. In 1919, the bugaboo had been far more imagi-
nary than real, but while false fears and the incitement of dema-
gogues fanned the flames of nativism and paranoia in the 1940's
and 1950's, even the most level-headed person could find much to
worry about. In a relatively short period of time one witnessed the
Berlin blockade, the triumph of Mao Tse-tung and the communists
in China, the first Soviet atomic bomb, the discovery that British
and American scientists had spied for the Russians, the invasion of
South Korea, and the exposure and subsequent conviction of the
Rosenbergs.
In response to both real and imagined threats, federal and state
governments established a number of so-called loyalty and security
programs that affected nearly everyone who worked for govern-
ment, from janitors on up, in what William 0. Douglas called "the
most intensive search fdr ideological strays that we have ever
known.""' The various laws passed, the committees that at-
tempted to ferret out "security risks," and the loyalty and security
programs led to numerous court challenges, primarily under the
First and to a lesser extent the Fifth Amendment, requiring judges
to balance the real or perceived needs of national security against
110. See Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (school desegregation); Engel v.
Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962) (school prayer); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (rights
of the accused); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (abortion).
111. DOUGLAS, supra note 18, at 57.
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the individual rights guaranteed in the Constitution.
Brandeis had warned in the post-World War I cases that in de-
termining whether speech, no matter how seemingly inflammatory,
actually posed a clear and present danger, courts "had to exercise
good judgment; and to the exercise of good judgment, calmness
[was], in times of deep feeling and on subjects which excite pas-
sion, as essential as fearlessness and honesty."112 But where Bran-
deis saw the judiciary as fearlessly standing against the tide of mob
emotion, Frankfurter saw danger in the courts becoming involved
in any manner. Frankfurter privately deplored the excesses of Mc-
Carthyism and the witch-hunts conducted in the name of national
security, and risked personal opprobrium in his defense of some of
the accused. "History teaches," he declared, "that the indepen-
dence of the judiciary is jeopardized when courts become em-
broiled in the passions of the day. 11 3 On the bench, however, he
continued to call for deference to the other agencies of govern-
ment, since he approved of their nominal goal of repulsing
communism.
Frankfurter, it should be noted, did not stand alone; until the
mid-fifties only Black and Douglas protested the attacks on First
Amendment rights, and their professional reputations suffered at
the hands of Frankfurter's acolytes at Harvard who praised his
"process jurisprudence" and devotion to judicial restraint and in-
stitutional deference. 1 4 If there is any group of cases that high-
lights the failure of Frankfurter's philosophy, it must be the First
Amendment decisions that came out of this second Red Scare.1 5
In March 1940, Congress reenacted the Espionage Act of 1917,
and then in June passed the Alien Registration, or Smith Act
which drew together a variety of anti-alien and anti-radical propos-
als. Although aimed primarily at the Communists, its broadly
phrased terms could apply to anyone conspiring to overthrow the
government, or even conspiring to advocate an overthrow." 6 The
112. Schaefer v. United States, 251 U.S. 466, 482-83 (1920) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
113. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 525 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
114. L.A. Powe, Jr., Justice Douglas after Fifty Years: The First Amendment, Mc-
Carthyism and Rights, 6 CONST. COMMENTARY 267, 277-79 (1989).
115. For a fuller discussion of Frankfurter's position in the various internal security cases,
see MELVIN I. UROFSKY, FELIX FRA.NKFURTER JUDICIAL RESTRAINT AND INDIVIDUAL LIBERTIES
104-27 (1991).
116. The genesis and provisions of the Smith Act are detailed in MICHAEL R. BELKNAP,
COLD WAR POLITICAL JUSTICE: THE SMITH ACT, THE COMMUNIST PARTY, AND AMERICAN CIVIL
LIBERTIES 9-34 (1977).
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Smith Act had caused little immediate impact because none of the
men serving as Attorney General during the war sympathized with
its provisions117
After the war, however, anti-communist sentiment within the
United States built as the iron curtain descended across Europe.
Harry Truman established a Temporary Committee on Employee
Loyalty in November 1946, and following criticism that he had not
gone far enough, set up a full scale Federal Loyalty and Security
Program the next year. The Attorney General and the FBI
launched a massive investigation of all federal employees under
Executive Order 9835. The Attorney General compiled a list of al-
legedly subversive organizations, with membership in any of these
groups constituting "reasonable doubt" about a person's loyalty.118
The Supreme Court entered the postwar era with relatively little
Speech Clause jurisprudence aside from the "clear and present
danger" test developed by Holmes and Brandeis in the 1920's. But
Holmes's famous aphorism about falsely shouting fire in a crowded
theater is not a very useful analytical tool to determine when a
danger is real, and if real, when it is proximate, and if proximate, if
it is of the magnitude that justifies state intervention.11 9
Justices Black and Douglas became increasingly unhappy with
the test, especially as applied by the conservative majority after
the war. Douglas believed that had Holmes and Brandeis had the
opportunity to develop their ideas more fully in additional speech
cases, they would have eventually abandoned the "clear and pre-
sent danger" test in favor of a free and unrestricted speech test
except in the most dire emergency. Douglas, in fact, later claimed
117. See, e.g., FRANCIS BIDDLE, IN BRIEF AUTHORITY 233-51 (1962).
118. PAUL L. MURPHY, THE CONSTITUTION IN CRISIS TIMES, 1918-1969, at 256-57 (1972).
The Court evaded the First Amendment issues involved in the blacklists when it upheld the
power of the Attorney General to make such a list, but granted a declaratory judgment
removing three organizations from the list. Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath,
341 U.S. 123 (1949). Frankfurter concurred in the result, but did address the constitutional
questions in terms of the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause rather than on First
Amendment grounds, reasoning that the Attorney General had not given notice, established
criteria for inclusion on the list, or held hearings at which the accused could respond, and
thus had failed to meet the constitutional test. Id. at 149, 171-72. Black and Douglas also
concurred and were the only justices even to indirectly inquire into the right of the govern-
ment to regulate ideas through proscriptive lists. Id. at 144 (Black, J., concurring); Id. at 174
(Jackson, J., concurring).
119. In this regard, see Alan M. Dershowitz, Shouting "Fire!," ATLANTIC, Jan. 1989, at
272.
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the Holmes dissent in Gitlow v. New York 120 "moved closer to the
First Amendment ideal.' '1 21
Black and Douglas, but especially Black, began to develop a new
jurisprudence that viewed the First Amendment, particularly the
Speech Clause, as occupying a "preferred" position among consti-
tutionally protected rights. They argued for an "absolutist" inter-
pretation of the First Amendment's prohibition against the
abridgement of speech. The First Amendment, in their view,
barred all forms of governmental restriction on speech such that
there was "no place in the regime of the First Amendment for any
'clear and present danger' test.'1 22 The reason, as Black explained
elsewhere, was because the test "[could] be used to justify the pun-
ishment of advocacy.' 1 23 It could only function as a balancing test,
and rights protected under the First Amendment cannot be bal-
anced; as such, it became "the most dangerous of the tests devel-
oped by the justices of the Court.' '1 24
For Frankfurter, on the other hand, the evaluation and balanc-
ing implicit in the "clear and present danger" test fit perfectly
with his conception of the role of the judiciary. By applying rigor-
ous tools of analysis and clear-headedly evaluating the circum-
stances, judges would be able to say with reasonable certainty
when a clear and present danger existed warranting state action
and when it did not. But by this view, explicating First Amend-
ment issues did not differ at all from explicating Commerce Clause
questions. In a letter to Stanley Reed, Frankfurter asked:
When one talks about "preferred," or "preferred position," one
means preference of one thing over another. Please tell me what
kind of sense it makes that one provision of the Constitution is to be
"preferred" over another .... The correlative of "preference" is
"subordination," and I know of no calculus to determine when one
provision of the Constitution must yield to another, nor do I know
any reason for doing so. 125
Comments like this led Douglas to charge that Frankfurter saw the
120. 268 U.S. 652, 672 (1925) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
121. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 452 (1969) (Douglas, J., concurring).
122. Id. at 454.
123. HUGo L. BLACK, A CONSrrUTONAL FArrH 52 (1969).
124. Id. at 50.
125. Letter from Felix Frankfurter to Stanley Reed (Feb. 7, 1956), Felix Frankfurter Pa-
pers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.
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First Amendment, not as a protection against state regulation of
speech, but as an invitation to do so, with "the constitutional man-
date being construed as only a constitutional admonition for mod-
eration.' 1 26 In fact, Frankfurter saw moderation as the guiding
light of jurisprudence; but would moderation serve the interests of
either justice or the First Amendment when the entire society
seemed inflamed by hysteria? The answer to this question can be
found in United States v. Dennis.127
While actively seeking "security risks" inside the government,
the Truman Administration went after the Communist Party di-
rectly. On July 20, 1948, it secured a grand jury indictment against
twelve members of the Party's national board, including Eugene
Dennis and William Z. Foster, for conspiring with one another and
with unknown persons to:
organize as the Communist Party of the United States, a society,
group, and assembly of persons who teach and advocate the over-
throw and destruction of the Government of the United States by
force and violence, and knowingly and willfully to advocate and
teach the duty and necessity of overthrowing and destroying the
Government of the United States by force, which said acts are pro-
hibited by ... the Smith Act. 2"
It would take nearly three years from this initial indictment for the
case to reach the Supreme Court on appeal from one of the most
bombastic political trials in American history.
Dennis constituted the final judicial validation of the govern-
ment's loyalty-security program. 2 ' In Dennis the Court deter-
mined the constitutionality of the Smith Act as applied to leaders
of the Communist Party. They had been indicted for (1) conspiring
126. DOUGLAS, supra note 18, at 47.
127. 341 U.S. 494 (1951); see infra text accompanying notes 130-133.
128. BELKNAP, supra note 116, at 51.
129. Unions had been purged of known or admitted communists under § 9(h) of the Taft-
Hartley Act, sustained by the Court in American Communications Association v. Douds, 339
U.S. 382 (1950). Frankfurter had concurred in all but one section of Chief Justice Vinson's
opinion. He and Jackson rejected that provision covering people who "believe in" the over-
throw of the government by force or unconstitutional methods, since "probing into men's
thoughts trenches on those aspects of individual freedom which we rightly regard as the
most cherished aspects of Western civilization." Id. at 415, 421 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
Additionally, the government loyalty program was upheld in Bailey v. Richardson, 341 U.S.
918 (1951) (per curiam) (equally divided court). Bailey relied heavily on the Attorney Gen-
eral's list of suspected organizations, which had been upheld in McGrath.
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to organize as an assembly of persons who teach and advocate the
overthrow and destruction of the government of the United States
by force and violence, and (2) advocating and teaching the duty
and necessity of overthrowing the government by force and
violence.130
At no point in the indictment did the government allege that
any revolutionary acts other than teaching and advocacy had taken
place, and although "seditious conspiracy" remained a crime on
the statute books, the Justice Department did not charge the
eleven men with conspiring to overthrow the government. 13' In es-
sence, they were tried and convicted of conspiring to form a party
to teach and advocate the overthrow of the government. By a vote
of six to two (with former Attorney General Tom Clark not partici-
pating), the Court affirmed the conviction.
The central issue involved in the case was reconciling the consti-
tutional guarantee of free speech with a conviction for no more
than speaking and teaching. The trial judge, Harold Medina,
solved the problem by the bridge of intent, instructing the jury
that it could find the defendants guilty if it believed the defend-
ants intended to overthrow the government as soon as the opportu-
nity arose.3 2 The highly respected Learned Hand sustained the
conviction on appeal, arguing that courts had to balance a number
of factors in applying a version of the clear-and-present danger
test. "In each case they must ask whether the gravity of the 'evil,'
discounted by its improbability, justifies such invasion of free
speech as is necessary to avoid the danger."' 33 Given the recent
events in Europe and Asia, it seemed evident that Russia intended
to conquer the world, and the American Communist Party, as a
highly disciplined arm of the international movement, stood ready
to act at a moment's notice. The conspiracy existed, and the gov-
ernment could act to avert the evil.
Chief Justice Vinson closely followed Hand's reasoning in his
plurality opinion for the Court, an opinion joined by Burton, Min-
ton and Reed. Although he paid lip service to the Holmes test,
130. United States v. Dennis, 183 F.2d 201, 205 (2d Cir. 1950), afl'd 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
131. See id. (no charge was listed).
132. Id. at 215.
133. Id. at 212. Hand personally disliked the Smith Act and, under his own earlier formu-
lation of the test, would have limited restriction of speech only to those instances where the
speech constituted a direct incitement to illegal action. Id. This test, however, never won the
support of a majority on the high court.
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Vinson pointed out that communism posed a far different and
more menacing danger than the anarchism and socialism that
Holmes and Brandeis dealt with in the 1920's cases. Therefore, the
clear and present danger test could not possibly mean that before
the government could act, it had to wait "until the putsch [was]
about to be executed, the plans [were] laid and the signal [was]
awaited."'11 4 By this line of reasoning, the government could not
only reach speech directly inciting unlawful action, conspiring to
promote such action or teaching that such action should occur, but
could also reach speech that conspired to organize a group that
would teach that such action ought to occur. 135
Michael Belknap claims that Frankfurter realized that the
Hand-Vinson modification of the clear-and-present danger test
"could produce harmful results in future cases-which had nothing
to do with communism."'136 Frankfurter therefore refused to join in
the plurality opinion, not because he objected to the results, but
because he disagreed with Vinson's reasoning. Frankfurter's con-
curring opinion in Dennis clearly states his judicial philosophy re-
garding the First Amendment, and it stands in stark contrast to
the powerful dissents filed by Black and Douglas.
Frankfurter began his opinion with the mandatory invocations of
judicial restraint and deference. "History teaches," he declared,
"that the independence of the judiciary is jeopardized when courts
become embroiled in the passions of the day and assume primary
responsibility in choosing between competing political, economic
and social pressures."' 37 The primary responsibility for those deci-
sions lay with the legislature, even in speech cases, and "there is
ample justification for a legislative judgment that the conspiracy
now before us is a substantial threat to national order and secur-
ity."'38 A careful review of all the relevant decisions made it clear,
he asserted, that the Court had reached the right results.
Frankfurter personally disagreed with the policy of the Smith
Act and feared that its heavy-handedness would silence not only
134. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 509 (1950).
135. For an analysis of this distortion of the original Holmes-Brandeis formulation, see
Louis B. Boudin, "Seditious Doctrines" and the "Clear and Present Danger" Rule, 38 VA.
L. REv. 143, 315 (1952). The decision is defended in Wallace Mendelson, "Clear and Pre-
sent Danger" - From Schenck to Dennis, 52 COLUM. L. REv. 52 (1952).
136. BELKNAP, supra note 116, at 145.
137. Dennis, 341 U.S. at 525 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
138. Id. at 542.
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those who sought to overthrow the government, but honest and
loyal critics of its policies as well. But his devotion to judicial re-
straint and his refusal to accept a preferred-position status for
speech or a special role for the courts in protecting civil liberties,
left him limited room to maneuver. He tried to do so by reserving
to the judiciary the right to review the application of laws which
otherwise appeared facially valid.139
That is what the Court had done in this case, and Frankfurter
emphasized that the seriousness of the communist danger far out-
weighed the "puny anonymities" that Holmes had defended in
Abrams or the "futile" advocacies in Gitlow. The Communist
Party, with its extensive organization, membership, and discipline
constituted a serious threat to the nation. On the other hand, of
course, one valued freedom of speech. But not "every type of
speech occupies the same position on the scale of values,"'140 and
"it is not for us to decide how we would adjust [this] clash of inter-
ests. . . . Congress has determined that the danger created by ad-
vocacy of overthrow justifies the ensuing restriction of freedom of
speech."'"
If in the Court's judgment Congress abused its discretion, unrea-
sonably tipped the balance too far in favor of security at the ex-
pense of freedom, or if the executive applied the law in an arbi-
trary and unfair manner, the Court would intervene; otherwise, a
reasonable judgment by Congress touching upon the security of the
nation should not be overturned by the judiciary. Frankfurter's
opinion in Dennis, read in light of history, reflects more of judicial
abdication of responsibility than measured deference and restraint.
It would be unfair to deride Frankfurter for failing to see then
what others only saw later. However, the evidence seems to suggest
that while he privately opposed the Smith Act prosecutions, he
truly did not believe the Court could interfere. Douglas's harsh
judgment that Frankfurter saw no difference between the Speech
Clause and the Commerce Clause seems borne out by Frank-
furter's own words. Douglas and Black did see a difference, and
139. Frankfurter quoted from an essay by his former student Paul Freund that the clear-
and-present danger test became a simplistic and useless tool unless it took into account
numerous factors. These included the relative seriousness of the danger, the availability of
other forms of control, and the specific intent of the speaker. PAUL A. FREUND, ON UNDER-
STANDING THE SuPRms COURT 27 (1949).
140. Dennis, 341 U.S. at 544 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
141. Id. at 550.
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their eloquent dissents in Dennis, derided at the time by the pro-
cess theorists as lacking in analysis, hit the mark perfectly.
Douglas summarized the majority position, including that of
Frankfurter, as the product of fear and panic. He then quoted
from Andre Vishinsky's The Law of the Soviet State that there
could be no freedom of speech for foes of socialism. Douglas also
warned his brethren and the country that "our concern should be
that we accept no such standard for the United States."'42 Eventu-
ally the country would recover from the Red Scare madness, and
the Black-Douglas position would be hailed for its unflinching de-
fense of free thought. Before that happened, however, many more
cases came to the Court, and although Frankfurter could occasion-
ally find procedural means to support free speech, his devotion to
judicial restraint and deference put him more often than not in the
antilibertarian camp.'43
VII. THE FAILURE OF RESTRAINT
In 1957, to celebrate Frankfurter's seventy-fifth birthday, the
Yale Law Journal dedicated its December issue in his honor.'4 No
other law journal took notice of the event, not even Harvard's, al-
though such milestones had long been an occasion for this type of
homage. Frankfurter himself had helped arrange a number of these
celebrations to honor Holmes, Brandeis, and Cardozo. While
Frankfurter no doubt took satisfaction that he and his followers
had captured Yale, the lack of recognition elsewhere only under-
scored the fact that he had never been able to exercise the leader-
ship over the Court that he and his supporters had expected. Al-
though he had managed to keep the Court's activist wing hemmed
in over the past dozen years, that limited hegemony would soon
pass. In 1962, his brethren on the Court handed Frankfurter a
stunning defeat and elicited from him his last major dissent.
In 1946 Frankfurter thought he had erected a high and impene-
trable wall to block judicial challenges to malapportioned state leg-
islatures. 45 Then the civil rights movement burst on the national
scene, and the NAACP went to court to challenge various southern
devices to deprive blacks of their votes. In Gomillion v.
142. Dennis, 341 U.S. at 591 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
143. See UROFSKY, supra note 115, at ch. 7.
144. See 67 YALE L.J. 179 (1957).
145. See Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549 (1946).
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Lightfoot,14e blacks challenged a gerrymandering scheme in Tus-
kegee, Alabama, that redrew city boundaries from a square into
"an uncouth twenty-eight-sided figure." 147  The plan disen-
franchised all but four or five of Tuskegee's registered black voters
without depriving a single white of the franchise.
Alabama argued that the doctrine of Colegrove v. Green 4s
barred jurisdiction. However, Frankfurter rejected this claim com-
pletely. The facts in Colegrove had affected all citizens; in Tus-
kegee "the inescapable human effect of this essay in geometry and
geography is to despoil colored citizens, and only colored citizens,
of their theretofore enjoyed voting rights. That was not Colegrove
v. Green.1' 49 The Fifteenth Amendment to the Constitution spoke
directly to the issue of black suffrage, and that moved the case
from the realm of political questions to direct constitutional
litigation.
Despite Frankfurter's best efforts to distinguish Gomillion from
Colegrove, the inherent contradiction could not be hidden. If black
citizens could secure judicial redress because their votes had been
diluted, then why shouldn't white citizens, suffering from a differ-
ent form of the same ailment, be able to seek similar relief?
The answer came one week later when the Court noted probable
jurisdiction in a case challenging Tennessee's apportionment
scheme.1 50 The Tennessee legislature had not been reapportioned
since 1901, even though the state constitution allocated representa-
tion on a population basis. The challengers claimed that this mal-
apportionment foreclosed the option of securing redress through
the traditionally preferred manner of legislative reform. They
asked the Court to block any further elections under the 1901 ap-
portionment and either direct at-large elections or decree a reap-
portionment based on the latest census figures.
Before the Court could decide whether to grant or deny relief,
146. 364 U.S. 339 (1960). Although Frankfurter spoke for a unanimous Court, Douglas
and Whittaker both filed brief concurring opinions. Douglas reiterated his adherence to his
dissent in Colegrove, id. at 348, while Whittaker believed the decision should have been
grounded in the Equal Protection Clause rather than in the Fifteenth Amendment. Id. at
349.
147. Id. at 340.
148. 328 U.S. 549 (1946).
149. Gomillion, 346 U.S. at 346-47.
150. Baker v. Carr, 364 U.S. 898 (1961) (probable jurisdiction noted). The decision in this
case is printed at 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
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however, it had to decide whether it had the power to do so. In
Colegrove, Frankfurter had argued that the Court lacked jurisdic-
tion in so-called "political questions" cases. If the Court followed
Colegrove, as Frankfurter urged his brethren to do, then the peti-
tioners would have to find some other way to break out of their
trap. To affirm jurisdiction required overruling Colegrove.
The Court heard oral argument on the case on April 19 and 20,
1961, and then ordered reargument for October 9, 1961.151 On
March 26, 1962, the Court announced its decision. Justice Brennan
held that jurisdiction existed, that the complaint stated a justicia-
ble cause of action, and that the claimants had standing to pursue
the case and seek relief. Brennan did not specifically overrule Cole-
grove. He noted accurately that four of the seven justices who par-
ticipated in that case had held that jurisdiction existed, but one of
them had also believed that a remedy could not be provided before
the next election and had therefore concurred in the result. Frank-
furter's former student adopted his one-time teacher's analytical
method, although Frankfurter probably did not appreciate his for-
mer student's purpose. Brennan knew what the objections would
be, and prepared a careful and lengthy opinion developing all of
the salient points, each one leading to the inevitable conclusion
that the Court could, in fact, take jurisdiction.
Six justices either joined in or concurred with Brennan; Whitta-
ker did not participate, and Harlan and Frankfurter entered
lengthy dissents. An obviously angry Frankfurter prefaced the de-
livery of his dissent with the comment that "[t]oday the Court be-
gins a process of litigation that it requires no prophet to say - and
Cassandra was sometimes right - will outlast the life of the
youngest member of this Court."' 2
The majority decision would plunge the Court into a task which
it had neither the experience nor the ability to handle: devising
"what should constitute the proper composition of the legislatures
of the fifty states."' 53 Frankfurter retraced the history of the politi-
cal question, explaining why previous courts in their wisdom had
refused to entertain such claims. One could hardly fail to note that
151. For oral arguments before the Court, see RICHARD C. COETNER, THE APPORTIONMENT
CASES ch. vi. (1970).
152. Id. at 140 (quoting Old Struggle on Apportionment Rescues Turning Point in
Court, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 27, 1962, at 20). The youngest member, of course, was not Brennan,
but Stewart. Brennan was the second youngest.
153. Baker, 369 U.S. at 269 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
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the states had "widely varying principles and practices that control
state legislative apportionment," and about the only common fea-
ture Frankfurter could discern was "geographic inequality in rela-
tion to the population standard.
154
Frankfurter predicted that the Court had plunged itself into a
morass from which it would be impossible to emerge, a quagmire
lacking judicially discoverable or administrable standards, an area
epitomized by partisan politics. The federal system itself would be
endangered by a new and "virulent source of friction and tension"
as the judiciary became embroiled in political matters.155 Clearly
Frankfurter felt that the Court had taken a terrible step.
One wishes that Frankfurter might have gone out on a better
note. His prophecies of a judicial nightmare never materialized,
and although the entrenched legislatures fought to prevent reap-
portionment, once it happened and a majority of the population
controlled a majority of the legislative seats, all opposition ceased.
Justice Douglas provided a judicially manageable standard of "one
man, one vote,"'"" which Chief Justice Warren later applied in a
suit against the Alabama apportionment scheme.157 The obvious
justness of the decision, and the equally obvious facility with which
it could be implemented, made subsequent readings of Frank-
furter's opinion seem more and more paranoid and unrealistic.
Compared to the democratic majesty of Warren's opinion in Reyn-
olds, Frankfurter's claim that "there is not under our constitution
a judicial remedy for every political mischief'158 sounds crabbed
and visionless. Warren spoke to the possibilities of democracy,
Frankfurter apparently could see only its limits.
VIII. THE JUSTICE REVISITED
One can appreciate Felix Frankfurter's contribution to American
jurisprudence even if one believes that Frankfurter misgauged ba-
sic trends in the nation's life or disagrees with his views about the
role of courts in protecting individual liberties. The values that he
cherished are not inconsequential, and in fact are essential in any
154. Id. at 321.
155. Id. at 324. Frankfurter suffered a stroke on April 5, 1962, a little over a week after
the Baker decision had been handed down. He retired from the Court on August 26.
156. Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 381 (1963).
157. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, reh'g denied, 379 U.S. 870, 871 (1964).
158. Baker, 369 U.S. at 270.
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scheme of ordered liberty. He matured intellectually at a time
when conservative judges used their power to invalidate the re-
forms enacted by the legislature, that branch of the government
most reflective of the will of the people. For him, judicial restraint
meant that the popular will ought not be thwarted by the courts
unless a specific constitutional prohibition existed. The ideal of
popular democracy is a powerful notion, and all but the most elit-
ist among us would agree that the will of the people should be the
dominant force in a free government. 159 However, the voice of the
people is not necessarily the voice of tolerance. Whatever their
other virtues, majorities are rarely tolerant of dissident beliefs and
dissenting voices, and while they may pay lip service to the protec-
tion of minority views or the rights of accused persons, American
history shows few instances of the majority, on its own volition,
behaving in such an ideal manner. 0
The Constitution is a unique document that empowers the will
of the majority while at the same time limiting that empowerment.
There is, of course, a built-in tension between those competing op-
erations, and resolving that tension is the unique function of the
Supreme Court. Frankfurter put it quite well when he wrote:
[T]he Founders knew that Law alone saves a society from being rent
by internecine strife or ruled by mere brute power however dis-
guised .... To that end they set apart a body of men, who were to
be the depositories of law, who by their disciplined training and
character and by withdrawal from the usual temptations of private
interest may reasonably be expected to be "as free, impartial, and
independent as the lot of humanity will admit."''
159. The view of judicial restraint as democratic in nature is explored in Sanford V. Lev-
inson, The Democratic Faith of Felix Frankfurter, 25 STAN. L. REv. 430 (1973). Levinson
also concludes that Frankfurter's views on judicial restraint and its relation to democracy
were forged in his academic years.
160. While Frankfurter certainly favored rights for unpopular speech, he seems to have
seen it more as a question of governmental policy than of constitutional protection. There is
a curious letter that Frankfurter wrote to an old friend, the great Harvard historian Samuel
Eliot Morison, who had questioned the justice regarding the extent to which the First
Amendment protected speech. Frankfurter referred to his own experience in the Sacco-Van-
zetti case:
Whether the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, through its appropriate organ, should
have put Sedgwick and me in durance vile for the Atlantic article on the Sacco-Van-
zetti case is one thing; whether Massachusetts would have been forbidden to do so by
the Constitution of the United States quite another.
Letter from Felix Frankfurter to Morison (Jan. 6, 1942) [misdated 1941], Papers of Felix
Frankfurter, Harvard Law School Library, Cambridge, Massachusetts.
161. United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258, 308 (1947) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring).
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Frankfurter studied the Court too long and too well not to recog-
nize that judging could not be a mechanical exercise, by which one
followed rigid rules to "discover" the law. He knew, even if he
could not bring himself to admit it openly, that the emotions and
biases of judges, as well as their learning and discipline, played a
role in judicial decisionmaking. Following his philosophy of selec-
tive incorporation, judges have definitely made value decisions as
to the greater importance of certain provisions of the Bill of Rights
over other parts.
Justice Black tried to negate this balancing by tying the judges
to an absolutist interpretation of the Constitution, and while in
certain areas - such as the protection of individual liberties -
this may be a more attractive option, it lacks the flexibility that
Frankfurter saw, and rightly so, as one of the essential attributes
of judging. Frankfurter understood that not all questions, not even
all legal questions, are amenable to simple answers. Situations be-
yond the wildest imaginations of the Framers require judges to
search long and hard in the Constitution and its history to deter-
mine what part of the document, if any, applies. In such circum-
stances, a judge must look to history, experience, and precedent,
and then, through disciplined reasoning, reach the best result he
can. Because this process is imperfect, judges must have humility;
they must be willing to recognize that the other arms of govern-
ment have as legitimate a claim to being right in these instances as
the courts. The obvious solution is, therefore, judicial restraint and
deference to the coordinate branches.
There is much to commend in a judiciary that is cautious in ex-
ercising its authority and aware that, in a federal system, the Con-
stitution distributes power between the states and the national
government as well as among the branches of government. A Su-
preme Court that has its own political agenda and pursues it ac-
tively violates the republican philosophy of a scheme of separated
powers. Felix Frankfurter preached this for almost a half-century,
first at the Harvard Law School and then on the Supreme Court,
and his ideas have been taken up in recent years by conservatives
such as Robert Bork and Edwin Meese who charge the Court with
exceeding its proper responsibilities.
The problem, as Frankfurter once acknowledged, is that judicial
restraint can quickly become judicial abdication. While the courts
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should certainly respect the judgments of the other branches of
government, they have a responsibility to measure those actions
against constitutional standards. One can argue that in hard and
complex questions courts should defer to the judgments of the
elective branches; Frankfurter often made that argument. It can
also be argued that in such situations the wisdom of the judiciary
is as compelling as that of the legislature, and that it is the unique
responsibility of the courts - not the legislature - to make those
judgments in certain circumstances.
Frankfurter's judicial philosophy matured in the late 1920's and
early 1930's and, with one or two minor exceptions, did not change
after he went onto the bench. The problem is that the challenges
coming before the Court changed radically at just about the time
Frankfurter donned the silk robe. Prior to World War II, nearly all
the major questions confronting the Court involved economic pol-
icy. While the Constitution places certain limits on the national
government in these areas, for the most part the constitutional
grants of power in regard to interstate commerce and taxation are
broadly defined. Under John Marshall and Roger Taney, as Frank-
furter himself had demonstrated,'62 the Court had taken an expan-
sive view of these powers, so that between 1880 and 1937, the use
of so-called freedom of contract and substantive due process to
cripple those powers represented an obvious effort by judges to
substitute their policy preferences for those of the legislature. In
calling for judicial restraint and deference, Frankfurter endorsed a
return to an older tradition.
Following the war, economic issues practically disappeared from
the Court's docket, replaced by questions of civil liberties and civil
rights. Here again Frankfurter's views appear to have been solidi-
fied well before he joined the Court, and they ran counter not only
to views of his colleagues, but to the general sentiment among the
population that the Court had a particular role to play in safe-
guarding individual rights and liberties.
Frankfurter simply did not believe that the Court had a special
role to play in protecting rights. He treated questions of free
speech the same as questions of economic regulation: in both, the
courts should defer to the legislature.
Frankfurter claimed that he modeled himself after Holmes and
162. FELIX FRANKFURTER, THE COMMERCE CLAUSE UNDER MARSHALL, TANEY AND WAITE
(1937).
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Brandeis, yet one looks in vain in his opinions for the type of con-
cern they showed about free speech. What can one compare in
Frankfurter's career to Holmes's dissent in Abrams6 3 or the Bran-
deis opinion in Whitney?' He pointed with pride to his dissent in
the second flag salute case, in which he deferred to the wisdom of a
state legislature in forcing young children to violate their religious
beliefs by saluting the flag, and even suggested that Roosevelt in-
clude a copy in the presidential library.165 His last major opinion,
his dissent in the apportionment case,'66 called for continuing the
dilution of voting rights in the name of judicial restraint.
It is not that Frankfurter lacked a vision, but rather that time
outran his vision; he would have been the perfect judge a genera-
tion earlier. Once on the bench he seemed ignorant of the tides of
history, of the changing social and political climate in the country
- the same sins with which he, as an academic commentator, had
lambasted the conservative judges in the 1920's and 1930's. He re-
mained consistent, but consistency is not always a virtue.
Frankfurter failed to gain the leadership on the Court not just
because of his abrasive personality. Black, Douglas, Murphy, Bren-
nan, Warren, and other strong-minded justices resented his pa-
tronizing tone and schoolmaster lecturing. Beyond that, they be-
lieved that the Court had a special obligation to do justice in
protecting the rights of racial minorities and those with dissident
points of view. In the long run, the Warren Court may be judged as
having been too activist, as having gone too far in its judicial
revolution, but in the 1950's and 1960's Warren, and Brennan,
Douglas, and Black, reflected the general sentiment that the Court
ought to be the guardian of the Bill of Rights.
Is guardianship of the Bill of Rights the role of the Court?
Frankfurter on numerous occasions seemed to indicate that it was,
that the Court had the responsibility and the authority to inter-
pret constitutional protections in the light of modern conditions,
thus keeping the Bill of Rights up to date. But when it came time
to put that theory into practice, he could not overcome his stronger
163. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 624 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
164. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 372 (1927) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
165. West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 646 (1943) (Frankfurter,
J., dissenting); Letter from Frankfurter to Franklin D. Roosevelt (May 3, 1943), reprinted
in MAX FREEDMAN, ROOSEVELT & FRANKFURTHmE THEm CORRESPONDENCE 1928-1948, at 699
(1967).
166. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 266 (1962) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
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belief in a court of exceedingly limited powers.
Fortunately for the Court and the nation, during most of our
history we have had a Supreme Court composed of justices with
varying judicial philosophies. While there have been periods when
one or another particular jurisprudence has been on the ascendent,
for the most part justices with differing viewpoints have reached
common sense conclusions that have met with the approval of the
American people. Reaching these conclusions in times of rapid so-
cial and political change is difficult, and there will be some who
cannot make the transition from one era to another. Felix Frank-
furter did not make that transition, and so in one sense his story is
tragic.
By adhering to his beliefs in judicial restraint, in deference to
the coordinate branches of government, in respect of precedent,
Frankfurter held up clear standards that forced the advocates of
change such as Hugo Black to rethink their assumptions. As Black
said after visiting with the ailing and retired Frankfurter, "Felix
made me see something in a different light.' ' 167 Black did not al-
ways agree with Frankfurter, but that did not matter. In the
twenty-three years Felix Frankfurter sat on the United States Su-
preme Court he forced his more activist colleagues to slow down
and think about what they were doing. If he could not get them to
adopt his vision of a time past, he did help them to hone their own
vision of the times to come.
167. UROFSKY, supra note 115, at 173.
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